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For two months between May and July 2015, a nationwide outbreak of Middle East respi-
ratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) occurred in Korea. On June 3, 2015, the Korean 
Society for Laboratory Medicine (KSLM) launched a MERS-CoV Laboratory Response Task 
Force (LR-TF) to facilitate clinical laboratories to set up the diagnosis of MERS-CoV infec-
tion. Based on the WHO interim recommendations, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention of United States guidelines for MERS-CoV laboratory testing, and other available 
resources, the KSLM MERS-CoV LR-TF provided the first version of the laboratory practice 
guidelines for the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV to the clinical laboratories on June 12, 
2015. The guidelines described here are an updated version that includes case definition, 
indications for testing, specimen type and protocols for specimen collection, specimen 
packing and transport, specimen handling and nucleic acid extraction, molecular detec-
tion of MERS-CoV, interpretation of results and reporting, and laboratory safety. The KSLM 
guidelines mainly focus on the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV, reflecting the unique sit-
uation in Korea and the state of knowledge at the time of publication.
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INTRODUCTION
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a viral respiratory 
disease caused by a novel coronavirus (MERS-CoV) that was 
first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012 [1]. No MERS cases were 
reported in Korea until May 20, 2015 when the first Korean 
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MERS case was identified in a 68-yr-old man returning from the 
Middle East. Since then a total of 186 confirmed cases have 
been reported in Korea as of Oct 2, 2015 [2, 3].
On June 3, 2015, the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine 
(KSLM) launched a MERS-CoV Laboratory Response Task Force 
(LR-TF) to facilitate clinical laboratories to set up the diagnosis of 
MERS-CoV infection. Although laboratory guidelines or resources 
for the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV had been provided by 
several international authoritative bodies [4, 5], the Korean ver-
sion of guideline was required in the unexperienced situation of 
the nationwide outbreak, which developed rapidly by intra-hospi-
tal and inter-hospital spread of an imported deadly virus. This 
outbreak was beyond national capacity of laboratory prepared-
ness for emerging infectious diseases. Therefore, the KSLM 
MERS-CoV LR-TF decided to provide the clinical laboratories 
with the laboratory practice guidelines of national standard for 
the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV. On behalf of the Central 
MERS-CoV Control Office in Korea, organized by the Korean Min-
istry of Health and Welfare (KMHW), the first version of the KSLM 
laboratory practice guidelines was issued on June 12, 2015.
This updated version of the KSLM laboratory practice guide-
lines for the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV is based on in-
terim recommendations for MERS-CoV laboratory testing by the 
WHO [4], the laboratory testing guidelines for MERS-CoV by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of United States (US 
CDC) [5], and other available resources [6-8].
The guidelines provided here focus on the molecular diagno-
sis of MERS-CoV from case definition to interpretation and re-
porting as well as laboratory safety.
CASE DEFINITION OF MERS-CoV INFECTION
The WHO, US CDC, and Saudi Arabia each has its own case 
definitions according to the purpose of use. WHO case defini-
tions are for classification and reporting [9]; as such, they 
should not be used for recommendations of when and whom to 
test. The case definitions of the US CDC are used to classify pa-
tients who should be evaluated for MERS-CoV infection in con-
sultation with state and local health departments [10]. Saudi 
Arabia also uses its case definitions for surveillance purposes 
[7]. The following case definitions are for classification and re-
porting to the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (KCDC).
Confirmed case: A person with laboratory confirmation of 
MERS-CoV infection by KCDC is regarded as a confirmed case 
irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms. Detection of viral 
nucleic acid by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction (rRT-PCR) is the method of choice for laboratory confir-
mation. Detailed protocols for rRT-PCR and interpretation of the 
results are described later in these guidelines. Although sero-
conversion assays were not used in the 2015 Korean outbreak, 
serological confirmation of a case requires the demonstration of 
seroconversion in two serum samples, ideally taken at least 14 
days apart, on the basis of enzyme immunoassay or immuno-
fluorescent assay as a screening and a neutralization assay.
Suspect case: A person with febrile acute respiratory illness of 
any severity plus either a history of travel to the Middle East or a 
direct epidemiological link with a confirmed MERS-CoV case 
within 14 days before symptom onset is regarded as a MERS-
CoV suspect case. The Middle East countries include Bahrain, 
Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. A 
direct epidemiological link with a confirmed MERS-CoV case 
showing relevant symptoms includes: with or without adequate 
personal protective equipment (PPE) plus one of 1) staying or 
living in the same room with a confirmed case; 2) healthcare-
associated exposure that includes providing care for MERS-CoV 
cases; 3) working with healthcare workers infected with MERS-
CoV; and/or 4) direct contact with the respiratory secretion of 
confirmed cases. 
Probable case: In addition to the case definitions of confirmed 
and suspect cases, the KSLM MERS-CoV LR-TF members 
agree that a case definition for a “probable case” is needed. A 
probable case can be defined as a suspect case with negative, 
indeterminate, or equivocal rRT-PCR results. In addition, an in-
dividual with preliminary positive rRT-PCR results from clinical 
laboratories but without confirmed results by KCDC can be de-
fined as a probable case. Repeat testing for MERS-CoV is rec-
ommended for probable cases.
INDICATIONS FOR TESTING
The KMHW approved the emergency use of rRT-PCR assays for 
MERS-CoV diagnosis in clinical laboratories with KSLM guaran-
tee of good laboratory practice from June 6, 2015 to the end of 
the outbreak. The KMHW defined the following indications to go 
for a MERS-CoV rRT-PCR test: 1) confirmation of a suspect 
case, 2) screening for a case with a direct epidemiological link, 
3) differential diagnosis of a patient with fever and community-
acquired pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome, 
and/or 4) criteria for releasing confirmed cases from quarantine. 
The KSLM recommends the testing for other respiratory patho-
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gens such as influenza viruses, parainfluenza viruses, and respi-
ratory syncytial virus, but emphasizes that there should not be 
any delay in testing for MERS-CoV because of those testing [4].
SPECIMEN TYPE AND PROTOCOLS FOR 
SPECIMEN COLLECTION
Lower respiratory specimens such as sputum, tracheal aspi-
rates, and bronchoalveolar lavage are preferred for the detection 
of MERS-CoV; however, collection of upper respiratory speci-
mens is recommended in addition to lower respiratory speci-
mens whenever possible (Table 1). Specimen collection is 
guided that nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs are col-
lected from the nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal walls, re-
spectively, not just from the nostril or mouth. Nasopharyngeal 
and oropharyngeal swabs could be placed in the same viral 
transport medium. Synthetic fiber flocked swabs with plastic 
shafts should be used to increase virus yield. Calcium alginate 
swabs or swabs with wooden shafts are not recommended be-
cause they may contain substances that inactivate some viruses 
and inhibit PCR reactions. In asymptomatic individuals, induced 
sputum or forced coughing may help collect lower respiratory 
tract specimens. The rRT-PCR of serum samples can be helpful 
for detecting MERS-CoV, but these assays are not recom-
mended for the routine diagnostic process in MERS-CoV out-
breaks.
While serological testing is impractical for clinical purposes 
during MERS-CoV outbreaks, it has incomparable importance 
for epidemiologic investigations. On the basis of WHO interim 
recommendations [4], serological testing for MERS-CoV can be 
used to identify confirmed MERS cases that can be reported 
under the International Health Regulations, to survey popula-
tion-based seroprevalence and to investigate past exposures. 
Because a total of 16,693 people were self-quarantined owing 
to contact history with confirmed MERS-CoV cases, investigation 
of seroprevalence in this population is necessary in order to un-
derstand the epidemiology and pathophysiology of MERS-CoV 
infection [2]. It is recommended that serum samples be col-
lected during the acute stage of the disease, preferably during 
the first week after illness onset and again during convales-
cence, at least 14 to 21 days after the acute stage sample was 
collected. If the acute stage sampling is missed, it should be 
collected at least 14 days after the onset of symptoms [4, 11]. 
All specimen types for routine testing from symptomatic con-
firmed/suspect/probable cases should be collected by trained 
healthcare workers wearing PPE. In addition, further precau-
tions for infection control and prevention in hospitals should be 
followed when exposure to aerosols such as tracheal intubation, 
bronchoalveolar lavage, and expectoration is expected as below.
1. Indications for additional precautions: expectoration of spu-
tum, tracheal aspiration, bronchoscopy, intubation, and extuba-
tion.
2. Personal protection
-  Restrict the number of healthcare workers in the room to 
avoid unnecessary exposure.
-  All healthcare workers should wear PPE, including N95 
masks, gloves, long-sleeved gowns, and eye protection 
equipment such as goggles or face shields.
-  Use hand hygiene before and after patient contact and after 
PPE removal.
3. Environmental control 
-  An isolation room with a ventilation system that generates 
negative pressure is recommended. If unavailable, a single 
room ventilated with 6 to 12 air changes per hour (through 
Table 1. Specimen types, sample containers, and transport conditions for molecular detection of Middle East respiratory syndrome corona-
virus (MERS-CoV) 
Type of specimen Container and transport media Transport condition
Category of potentially 
infectious substances
Lower respiratory tract Sputum
Bronchoalveolar lavage
Tracheal aspirate
Biopsy or autopsy sample
Sterile screw-capped container
Sterile screw-capped container
Sterile screw-capped container
Virus transport medium or sterile normal saline 
   tube for cell culture
4°C
If MERS-CoV test cannot be 
   performed within 72 hr, 
   freeze and transfer on dry ice
Category B
Upper respiratory tract Nasopharyngeal aspirate
Combined nasopharyngeal/
   oropharyngeal swab*
Sterile screw-capped container
Universal transport media
*Combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab: both nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs should be placed in the same vial to increase viral 
load. Swabs specifically designed for viral testing should be used (flocked synthetic fiber swabs with plastic shaft). Calcium alginate swabs or swabs with 
wooden shafts should be avoided.
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forced ventilation duct system) can be used.
-  After procedures, the room should be cleaned and evacu-
ated for 30 minutes (in the case of 12 air changes).
- Access to the room during procedures should be minimized.
SPECIMEN PACKING AND TRANSPORT
Double package systems can be used for transportation within 
an institution. All specimens must be packaged in a leak-proof 
plastic primary container with a screw cap. Primary containers 
that are decontaminated with 70% alcohol swabs and placed in 
a clear re-sealable zipper bag with absorbents must be pack-
aged with a secondary container for transfer. Accurate labeling 
or the attachment of barcodes, including at least two patient 
identifiers on all specimens as well as on the package, is essen-
tial to avoid specimen mix-ups and contamination.
For transportation outside an institution, triple package sys-
tems must be used according to the KCDC guidelines [12]. 
Similar to within-an-institution transfer, all specimens must be 
packed in double containers. The secondary containers are 
packed with the associated information sheets such as request 
forms or information forms in the tertiary container, which is 
consistent with infectious substance shipping guidance by 
KCDC [15]. 
SPECIMEN HANDLING AND NUCLEIC ACID 
EXTRACTION
All specimens should be stored at 2-8°C up to 72 hr before nu-
cleic acid extraction. If nucleic acid extraction cannot be per-
formed within 72 hr after collection, specimens should be 
stored at -70°C or lower as soon as possible after collection. 
MERS-CoV RNA should be extracted by using appropriate man-
ual or automated nucleic acid extraction methods. For example, 
the QIAamp DSP Viral RNA Mini kit (QIAGEN GmbH, Hilden, 
Germany) is one of the most widely used manual extraction 
methods, and the NucliSENS easyMAG (bioMérieux, Durham, 
NC, USA), MagNA Pure 96 System (Roche, Basel, Switzerland), 
and QIAcube (QIAGEN) are commonly used automated nucleic 
extraction methods. Nucleic acid extraction from sputum, tra-
cheal aspirates, bronchoalveolar lavage, nasopharyngeal or oro-
pharyngeal swabs, or blood should be performed according to 
the manufacturers’ instructions. RNA samples should be stored 
at -70°C or lower.
MOLECULAR DETECTION OF MERS-CoV RNA
rRT-PCR is recommended for the molecular detection of MERS-
CoV RNA. Laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection re-
Fig. 1. Laboratory process for the diagnosis of Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus infection in Korea.
Abbreviations: upE, upstream of the E gene; ORF1a, open reading frame 1a; ORF1b, open reading frame 1b; Ct, cycle threshold; KCDC, Korea Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.
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quires either a positive rRT-PCR result for at least two specific 
genomic targets or a single positive target with sequencing of a 
second target. The upstream of the E protein gene (upE), open 
reading frame 1a (ORF1a), open reading frame 1b (ORF1b), 
and N genes are common targets for rRT-PCR, while RNA-de-
pendent RNA polymerase (RdRp), ORF1b, and N genes are 
targets for sequencing.
Practically, rRT-PCR assays targeting upE are recommended 
for screening (Fig. 1). If the upE screening assay is positive, an 
independent, confirmatory rRT-PCR assay targeting ORF1a 
should be performed. Laboratory developed tests and commer-
cial kits for rRT-PCR assay should be used with provision of 
positive control and validation by LR-TF. 
A heterologous internal control to identify possible rRT-PCR 
inhibition and to confirm the integrity of the reagents of the kit is 
essential. Each run of rRT-PCR reaction should include both 
positive and negative controls in parallel. It is mandatory for all 
clinical laboratories to participate in the external quality control 
assessment organized by the KSLM LR-TF.
RESULTS INTERPRETATION AND REPORTING
The first step of interpretation of MERS-CoV rRT-PCR is verifica-
tion of the internal control (Fig. 1). Negative reactions in the in-
ternal control indicate a failure of the amplification process ow-
ing to either the presence of PCR inhibitors or other reasons. In 
this case, retesting the same sample is required after processing 
it to eliminate the inhibitory effect, including re-extraction of the 
nucleic acids or dilution of the extracted nucleic acids. When 
the internal control is properly amplified, the results can be clas-
sified as screen-negative, -indeterminate, or -positive according 
to the cycle threshold (Ct) values and whether the upE gene 
was amplified. Screen-positive specimens should be confirmed 
by amplification of ORF1a or other targets. When indeterminate 
or equivocal results are obtained in suspect cases, the results 
should be reported immediately to infection control units in 
each hospital.
A series of negative results in the cases which have definite 
contact history should not rule out MERS-CoV infection, and 
factors that can cause false negatives such as poor specimen 
quality, too early or late stage specimens, inappropriate handling 
or specimen transport, and inherent testing problems should be 
investigated by obtaining an additional specimen (especially a 
lower respiratory specimen), by the verification of an internal 
control, or by retesting the sample at another facility for confir-
mation.
LABORATORY SAFETY
Diagnostic laboratory work and rRT-PCR analysis on clinical 
specimens from suspect, confirmed, or probable cases of 
MERS-CoV should be conducted in clinical laboratories with 
BSL-2 facilities [13, 14]. Appropriate PPE should be worn, and 
all technical procedures should be performed in a way that 
minimizes the formation of aerosols and droplets in class II bio-
safety cabinets with current certification. After completion of 
daily work, the workspace is cleaned with 70% alcohol, and all 
PPEs are removed. Hand hygiene is necessary whenever PPEs 
are removed and before exit from laboratories. All wastes and 
remaining specimens should be discarded by legislative regula-
tion of medical wastes, but clinical specimens positive for 
MERS-CoV rRT-PCR should be discarded after sterilization such 
as autoclaving. The dilution or aliquot procedures of the poten-
tially infectious substances, including the procedures for bacte-
rial or fungal cultures, should be performed within a biological 
safety cabinet.
CONCLUSIONS
These guidelines reflect our current understanding of MERS-CoV 
at the time of publication and the unique situation of the Korean 
MERS-CoV outbreak. When a clinical laboratory is to perform 
molecular testing for MERS-CoV, each laboratory should prepare 
its own protocols according to these guidelines and other avail-
able resources. In addition, laboratory layouts and facilities that 
are not covered in these guidelines should be checked in order 
to prevent contamination during PCR procedures and also to 
provide a safe environment for all laboratory staff.
In conclusion, KSLM has established the practice guidelines 
for the molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV during an outbreak in 
Korea in 2015. To prepare laboratory response to prevent and 
control public health crisis by emerging infectious diseases in 
future, practice guidelines for laboratory diagnosis of other pos-
sible agents should be prepared with preemptive risk assess-
ment in cooperation with public and private sectors. 
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